/tmp races in gcc.c [Fwd]

[Marc Lehmann]

>If the temporary filenames are essentially unpredictable (e.g.  pid plus a
>sequence of randomly generated characters), it should defeat this hack and
>reduce the probability of collision to an arbitrarily low value.  In the
>meantime paranoid folks can set TMPDIR to a directory only they can read
>or write (e.g. /root/tmp).  This defeats the hack.

Please don't do this! there are sooo many bad programs out there
using this (bogus!) kind of "fix"...

there is no such thing as a random character sequence (which is accaptable
for implementation in gcc), and you can be sure the exploit for any scheme
you might device is available within hours/days of it's creation..

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      ---==---(_)__  __ ____  __       Marc Lehmann       +--
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    The choice of a GNU generation                        |
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