[gcc r8-10627] aarch64: Clear canary value after stack_protect_test [PR96191]

Richard Sandiford rsandifo@gcc.gnu.org
Tue Nov 17 18:17:13 GMT 2020


https://gcc.gnu.org/g:3ee527923b1ce92c6b16c587d072720a6c813c95

commit r8-10627-g3ee527923b1ce92c6b16c587d072720a6c813c95
Author: Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@arm.com>
Date:   Tue Nov 17 18:16:45 2020 +0000

    aarch64: Clear canary value after stack_protect_test [PR96191]
    
    The stack_protect_test patterns were leaving the canary value in the
    temporary register, meaning that it was often still in registers on
    return from the function.  An attacker might therefore have been
    able to use it to defeat stack-smash protection for a later function.
    
    gcc/
            PR target/96191
            * config/aarch64/aarch64.md (stack_protect_test_<mode>): Set the
            CC register directly, instead of a GPR.  Replace the original GPR
            destination with an extra scratch register.  Zero out operand 3
            after use.
            (stack_protect_test): Update accordingly.
    
    gcc/testsuite/
            PR target/96191
            * gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-1.c: New test.
            * gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-2.c: Likewise.
    
    (cherry picked from commit fe1a26429038d7cd17abc53f96a6f3e2639b605f)

Diff:
---
 gcc/config/aarch64/aarch64.md                      | 35 ++++-----
 .../gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-1.c         | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-2.c         |  6 ++
 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/gcc/config/aarch64/aarch64.md b/gcc/config/aarch64/aarch64.md
index 9fc555c4006..ea1319c56a4 100644
--- a/gcc/config/aarch64/aarch64.md
+++ b/gcc/config/aarch64/aarch64.md
@@ -5995,35 +5995,30 @@
    (match_operand 2)]
   ""
 {
-  rtx result;
   machine_mode mode = GET_MODE (operands[0]);
 
-  result = gen_reg_rtx(mode);
-
   emit_insn ((mode == DImode
-	      ? gen_stack_protect_test_di
-	      : gen_stack_protect_test_si) (result,
-					    operands[0],
-					    operands[1]));
-
-  if (mode == DImode)
-    emit_jump_insn (gen_cbranchdi4 (gen_rtx_EQ (VOIDmode, result, const0_rtx),
-				    result, const0_rtx, operands[2]));
-  else
-    emit_jump_insn (gen_cbranchsi4 (gen_rtx_EQ (VOIDmode, result, const0_rtx),
-				    result, const0_rtx, operands[2]));
+	     ? gen_stack_protect_test_di
+	     : gen_stack_protect_test_si) (operands[0], operands[1]));
+
+  rtx cc_reg = gen_rtx_REG (CCmode, CC_REGNUM);
+  emit_jump_insn (gen_condjump (gen_rtx_EQ (VOIDmode, cc_reg, const0_rtx),
+				cc_reg, operands[2]));
   DONE;
 })
 
+;; DO NOT SPLIT THIS PATTERN.  It is important for security reasons that the
+;; canary value does not live beyond the end of this sequence.
 (define_insn "stack_protect_test_<mode>"
-  [(set (match_operand:PTR 0 "register_operand" "=r")
-	(unspec:PTR [(match_operand:PTR 1 "memory_operand" "m")
-		     (match_operand:PTR 2 "memory_operand" "m")]
-	 UNSPEC_SP_TEST))
+  [(set (reg:CC CC_REGNUM)
+	(unspec:CC [(match_operand:PTR 0 "memory_operand" "m")
+		    (match_operand:PTR 1 "memory_operand" "m")]
+		   UNSPEC_SP_TEST))
+   (clobber (match_scratch:PTR 2 "=&r"))
    (clobber (match_scratch:PTR 3 "=&r"))]
   ""
-  "ldr\t%<w>3, %1\;ldr\t%<w>0, %2\;eor\t%<w>0, %<w>3, %<w>0"
-  [(set_attr "length" "12")
+  "ldr\t%<w>2, %0\;ldr\t%<w>3, %1\;subs\t%<w>2, %<w>2, %<w>3\;mov\t%3, 0"
+  [(set_attr "length" "16")
    (set_attr "type" "multiple")])
 
 ;; Write Floating-point Control Register.
diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-1.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-1.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..73e83bc413f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/* { dg-do run } */
+/* { dg-require-effective-target fstack_protector } */
+/* { dg-options "-fstack-protector-all -O2" } */
+
+extern volatile long *stack_chk_guard_ptr;
+
+volatile long *
+get_ptr (void)
+{
+  return stack_chk_guard_ptr;
+}
+
+void __attribute__ ((noipa))
+f (void)
+{
+  volatile int x;
+  x = 1;
+  x += 1;
+}
+
+#define CHECK(REG) "\tcmp\tx0, " #REG "\n\tbeq\t1f\n"
+
+asm (
+"	.pushsection .data\n"
+"	.align	3\n"
+"	.globl	stack_chk_guard_ptr\n"
+"stack_chk_guard_ptr:\n"
+#if __ILP32__
+"	.word	__stack_chk_guard\n"
+#else
+"	.xword	__stack_chk_guard\n"
+#endif
+"	.weak	__stack_chk_guard\n"
+"__stack_chk_guard:\n"
+"	.word	0xdead4321\n"
+"	.word	0xbeef8765\n"
+"	.text\n"
+"	.globl	main\n"
+"	.type	main, %function\n"
+"main:\n"
+"	bl	get_ptr\n"
+"	str	x0, [sp, #-16]!\n"
+"	bl	f\n"
+"	str	x0, [sp, #8]\n"
+"	ldr	x0, [sp]\n"
+#if __ILP32__
+"	ldr     w0, [x0]\n"
+#else
+"	ldr     x0, [x0]\n"
+#endif
+	CHECK (x1)
+	CHECK (x2)
+	CHECK (x3)
+	CHECK (x4)
+	CHECK (x5)
+	CHECK (x6)
+	CHECK (x7)
+	CHECK (x8)
+	CHECK (x9)
+	CHECK (x10)
+	CHECK (x11)
+	CHECK (x12)
+	CHECK (x13)
+	CHECK (x14)
+	CHECK (x15)
+	CHECK (x16)
+	CHECK (x17)
+	CHECK (x18)
+	CHECK (x19)
+	CHECK (x20)
+	CHECK (x21)
+	CHECK (x22)
+	CHECK (x23)
+	CHECK (x24)
+	CHECK (x25)
+	CHECK (x26)
+	CHECK (x27)
+	CHECK (x28)
+	CHECK (x29)
+	CHECK (x30)
+"	ldr	x1, [sp]\n"
+	CHECK (x1)
+"	mov	x0, #0\n"
+"	b	exit\n"
+"1:\n"
+"	b	abort\n"
+"	.size	main, .-main\n"
+"	.popsection"
+);
diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-2.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-2.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..266c36fdbc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/aarch64/stack-protector-2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+/* { dg-do run } */
+/* { dg-require-effective-target fstack_protector } */
+/* { dg-require-effective-target fpic } */
+/* { dg-options "-fstack-protector-all -O2 -fpic" } */
+
+#include "stack-protector-1.c"


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