This is the mail archive of the
gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org
mailing list for the GCC project.
[PATCH] i386: Mask out the CF_SET bit for -fcf-protection check
- From: "H.J. Lu" <hongjiu dot lu at intel dot com>
- To: gcc-patches at gcc dot gnu dot org
- Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak at gmail dot com>, Igor Tsimbalist <igor dot v dot tsimbalist at intel dot com>
- Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 13:09:27 -0800
- Subject: [PATCH] i386: Mask out the CF_SET bit for -fcf-protection check
- Authentication-results: sourceware.org; auth=none
- Reply-to: "H.J. Lu" <hjl dot tools at gmail dot com>
Since ix86_option_override_internal sets the CF_SET bit in
flag_cf_protection and it can be called more than once via pragma,
we need to mask out the CF_SET bit when checking flag_cf_protection.
OK for trunk if there is no regression?
H.J.
---
PR target/84248
* config/i386/i386.c (ix86_option_override_internal): Mask out
the CF_SET bit when checking -fcf-protection.
---
gcc/config/i386/i386.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gcc/config/i386/i386.c b/gcc/config/i386/i386.c
index 6c612c77987..ef7ff89bcbb 100644
--- a/gcc/config/i386/i386.c
+++ b/gcc/config/i386/i386.c
@@ -4913,12 +4913,12 @@ ix86_option_override_internal (bool main_args_p,
= build_target_option_node (opts);
/* Do not support control flow instrumentation if CET is not enabled. */
- if (opts->x_flag_cf_protection != CF_NONE)
+ cf_protection_level cf_protection
+ = (cf_protection_level) (opts->x_flag_cf_protection & ~CF_SET);
+ if (cf_protection != CF_NONE)
{
- switch (flag_cf_protection)
+ switch (cf_protection)
{
- case CF_NONE:
- break;
case CF_BRANCH:
if (! TARGET_IBT_P (opts->x_ix86_isa_flags2))
{
@@ -4953,7 +4953,7 @@ ix86_option_override_internal (bool main_args_p,
}
opts->x_flag_cf_protection =
- (cf_protection_level) (opts->x_flag_cf_protection | CF_SET);
+ (cf_protection_level) (cf_protection | CF_SET);
}
if (ix86_tune_features [X86_TUNE_AVOID_128FMA_CHAINS])
--
2.14.3